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In the Supreme Court
OPTHE

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

No. 6254

FRANK R. HILL,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PROCEEDINGS PRIOR TO AND AFTER TRIAL
On the 19th day of October, a Complaint was filed
before a Justice of the Peace at Delta, Millard County,
State of Utah, charging the defendant, Frank R. Hill, with
committing the crime of obtaining p11operty by false pre-tense. The charging part of said Complaint reads as follows.:
'"That the said Frank R. Hill at the time and
place last aforesaid did obtain 112,905 pounds of
alfalfa hay of a value of $536.30 from Dudley and
Reed Crafts by means of false pretense.,,

A preliminary hearing was held before the Justice
of the Peace on October 26, 1939, and the defendant was
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held to answer the charge in the district court. Thereafter,
on the 22nd day of January, 1940, an information was
filed in the district court of the Fifth Judicial Dis.trict in and for Millard Oounty, State of Utah, by the
District Attorney. Said information charges the offense
in the form prescribed by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935,
as follows:
HThat the said Frank R. Hill on or about the
31st day of July, 1939, at Delta, County of Mil.lard, State of Utah, did obtain 112,905 pounds of
alfalfa hay of a value of $536.30 from Dudley
and Reed Crafts by means of false pretense.""
The defendent thereupon filed a motion ro quash the
information and a demand for a Bill of Particulars. The
motiQn to quash- was overruled, and the State was ordered
to furnish a Bill of Particulars, which Bill of Particulars
was furnished on February 23, 1940. Thereupon the de.fendant filed a supplement motion to quash, which the
court denied. The defendant thereupon demanded a fur ..
ther and additional Bill of Particulars, which was ordered
by the court, and was filed by the State on February 23,
1940. Following the trial of the action, the Court, by
virtue of the authority granted by sub.-section 2, Section
105.-21.-43, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as enacted by
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935, di~ected the Bill of
Particulars to be amended in certain particulars to con'
form to the evidence presented at the trial of the case. An
amended or supplemental Bill of Particulars was filed on
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the 4th day of March, 1940, which supplemental Bill of
Particulars reads as follows:
"lhe State of Utah herewith submits the fol.lowing as a Supplemental Bill of Particulars in
the above entitled action:
"lhat on or about the 31st day of July, 1939,
at Delta, Millard County, Utah, Dudley Crafts
discussed with the Defendant, Frank R. Hill, the
sale of certain hay then belonging to Reed ·crafts
and I. R. Parker, which Dudley Crafts was then
authorized oo sell for the said owners; that at that
time the defendant was the Vice.-President and
manager of the Hill Brothers" Alfalfa Milling Com.pany, a corporation. That in the course of the· said dis.cussion Dudley Crafts said to the defendant, "I
want to know what your financial condition is
before we let you have the hay," and said further
in substance ''that they absolutely would not let
the defendants oompany have the hay unless its
financial condition was such that they (Crafts) were
sure to get their money.' That in answer to~ the
above the defendant said, "This time, Dudley, we
are going to tell you the truth about it, the fact is,
we have enough outstanding accounts to pay every
dollar we owe., "That the defendant said in sub.stance that the Company, the said Hill Brothers"
Alfalfa Milling Company, was in good financial
condition, and had enough outstanding accounts re.ceivable to pay all its obligations." That the above
statement was false and untrue and said company
was then insolvent all of which defendant well knew;
that Dudley Crafts relied upon the statements of
the defendant as aforesaid and sold to the said Hill
Brothers" Alfalfa Milling Company 112,905 pounds
of hay belonging to Reed Crafts and I. R. Parker
for the sum of $536.30; that the same has not been
paid except the sum of approximately $246.00; that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the said statements of defendant were false and
untrue, which defendant well knew, and that the
same were made with intent to cheat and defraud
Dudley and Reed Crafts and I. R. Parker."'
ELLIS PICKETI.
EVIDENCE GIVEN AT THE TRIAL
The State offered the following evidence at the trial
of the case:
Dudley Crafts testified that on or about the 31st day
of July, 1939, the defendant telephoned him and told him
that he wanted to buy a particular stack of hay which,
Crafts informed him, belonged to his brother, Reed Crafts,
whom he would have to see about the sale. Later the same
day a conf•erence took place in the office of Hill Brothers,
Alfalfa Milling Company at Delta, the defendant, Daryl
Pearson and Dudley Crafts being present.
The testimony as to this conversation is as follows:
""Q. Now, will you state what conversation
you had with him at that time with reference to the
sale of hay to the defendant?
""A. I told him that I had come down there to
find out just what the exact financial condition of
the Hill Brothers, Milling Company was before we
oould let them have the hay. I told him that I
had to know that before I could let him have the
hay, because we couldn't afford to lose it.
""Q. When you said "we' whom did you
mean?
"'A. My brother and I.
""Q. All right, what did he say?
"'A. Well, he says, "Dudley, this time we are
going to tell you the truth about it,' he said, '"we
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have got outstanding accounts, good accounts, to
pay every dollar we owe.' And he went on, he
said, "you understand how it is, we send this stuff
out over the country to the poultrymen and stock.markets, they are slow pay, but they are good pay,
we always get our money., I told him that is all we
wanted to know, that they had property to pay
for the hay, if that was true, they could have it.
""Q. Upon those representations state wheth..
er o~ not you and Reed Crafts sold the hay to him.
""A. Yes, we sold it.
c.~.Q. How much hay?
"'"A. I don't remember the exact amount over,
something over fifty tons.
'"'"Q. Do you know the total amount·for which
you sold the hay?
'"'"A. $536 and some odd cents.
Crafts stated that the defendant took his own truck
and went down and got the hay during the next three days,
but that it was not paid for until attachment .proceedings
were instituted, at which time approximately $246 were
recovered.
The State then called Daryl H. Pearson who testified
that he had been a bookkeeper. for Hill Brothers, Alfalfa
Milling Company between about July, 1938, and August,
1939, and that he had served also ·as secretary and treas ..
urer of the corporation, and in this capacity he had kept
the books and prepared financial statements of the corpora..
tion. He produced a financial statement of the oorporation
prepared by himself on the 30th of June, 1939, which state.
ment was offered and received in evidence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

This statement shows that on June 30, 1939, the ac-counts receivable of the Hill Brothers' Alfalfa Milling Cor-poration included advances to employees and offiecrs of the
corporation, totaled $3,664. 78, whereas, the accounts pay-able, including advances fro~ brokers, amounted to
$14,605.14. In addition to this, the statement shows notes
payable in the amount of $1,867.28. Pearson was then asked
what was the financial condition of the company on July 31,
as compared with June 30, and testified as follows:
foi.A. Well, I should say it was better July
31st than it was June 30, 1939 .
. . Q. Could you.give the court any idea how
much better it was?
'-'-A. Well I would say between six and
eight hundred dollars better.
~.~.Q. Nqw of what assets would these addi.tional assets consist of?
'-'-A. Well, it would, I imagine it would show
more ,of a reduction in the liabilities than it would
increase in the assets''.
Dudley Crafts was then recalled and examnied on be.half of the State and testified that at a meeting with
the defendant on the evening of October 18, 19 39, in Crafts,
office, which meeting was attended by Peter Gronning, Frank
Roberts, the defendant and Crafts, a discussion was had regarding the financial condition of Hill's company on July
31. In regard to the conversation Crafts testified:
'-"A. Why, we talked about a great many
things, but particularly with respect to this matter
now, I told him that when he bought the hay from
me that he lied to me, that he knew he lied when
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he said they had enough outstanding acoounts to
pay every bill they owed. He says: ~.Yes, but if I
hadn ,t said that you wouldn "t have sold me the hay., ,,

A stipulation was then entered into by oounsel to the
effect that if Rulon Hinckley, Frank Roberts, and Peter
Gronning were called to testify they would testify substan,
tially as Dudley Crafts testified with respect to this con,
versation.
ARGUMENT I
In his first argument in support of his Assignments
of Error 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, the defendant claims that
the State has neither alleged in its information or Bill of
Particulars, facts su:fficent to constitute an offense, nor does
the evidence offered at the trial show the commission of a
public offense of any type whatever.
In making his argument, the defense ignores entirely
the amendments in the Bill of Particulars which were ordered
by the Judge following the trial. Whether or not the court
was in error in directing these amendments to be made will
be considered hereafter in answering defendants Assign..
ment of Error, No. 19.
For the purpose of the present argument, let us con,
sider the amended Bill of Particulars together with the in,
formation in determining whether or not a public offense
was charged, and if .so whether the evidence introduced at
the trial was sufficient to prove the commission of such an
offense. The information follows the form prescribed by
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Sub.-section ( 2) of Section 10 5.. 21.-4 3, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 1933, as enacted by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935,
which Sub.-section provides as follows:
""The following forms may be used in cases in
which they are applicable.

*****

""A. B. obtained an automobile from C. D. by
means of false pretenses."
The information in this case alleges ""That the said
Frank Hill on or about the 31st day of July, 1939, at Delta,
Millard County, State of Utah, did obtain 112,905 pounds
of alfalfa seed of the value of $536.30 from Dudley and
Reed Crafts by means of false pretenses.'' The amended
Bill of Particulars sets forth the nature of the false pretenses
which were, in effect, that the defendant obtained the hay
in question from Dudley Crafts for Hill Brothers' Alfalfa
Milling Corporation, a corporation, of which he was vice..
president and general manager, by representing orally to said
Dudley Crafts that said Corporation had enough outstanding accounts to pay every dollar they owed.
The Bill of Particulars further alleges that said repre..
sentation was untrue as the company was at that time in..
solvent, all of which the defendant well knew, and that the
representations which he made were made with the intent to
cheat and defraud Dudley Crafts, through whom the hay
was purchased, and Reed Crafts and I. R. Parker, who
owned the hay.
The evidence presented at the trial in support of the
allegations thus made showed that the defendant approached
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Dudley Crafts relative to purchasing the hay, and that Dud..
ley Crafts informed the defendant that unless the company
was in good shape financially they oould not have the hay.
The evidence further shows that the defendant repre..
sented that they had outstanding accounts sufficient to pay
every dollar which they, the corporation, owed. The :finan..
cia! statement which was offered and accepted in evidence
showed that far from having enough accounts to pay every..
thing they owed, the oorporation was actually insolvent;
.its accounts totaling $3,664.78, whereas, the corporation
owed $16,472.42 on June 30th when the last :financial
statement was rendered. According to the testimony of
the Secretary.-Treasurer and bookkeeper ·of the corporation,
it had no more assets, and only $600 to $800 less in liabili.ties a month later when the representation complained of
was made.
The evidence further showed that the defendant later
in the presence of Dudley Crafts and three other witnesses,
admitted that he had lied regarding the financial standing of
the Company at the time he made the representations upon
which he obtained the hay from Dudley Crafts, and further
admitted that he made the representations because he
knew that if he told the truth Crafts would be unwilling to
let him have the hay.
Defendant bases most of his first argument upon the
proposition that it is not a fraudulent misrepresentation
within the meaning of this statute for the defendant to
promise to pay for the hay and then fail to 4o so, and
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he cites numerous cases in support of this proposition. The
State agrees that these cases state the law on the subject,
and that a mere failure to keep a promise to pay does not
constitute obtaining property by false representation even
though the person obtaining the property had agreed to pay.
This argument of the defendant and the cases cited in
support thereof, however, have no bearing on the case at
issue. The State does not base its case upon the fact that
the defendant failed to ke•ep his promise to pay for the hay.
The failure to pay has no connection with the case except
as to the evidentiary bearing it may have upon the question
of good faith and intent to defraud.
The defendant in his brief says: ""The purchase of goods
on the promise to pay in the future is not a false pretense.
A false pretense is a misrepresentation as to an existing fact
or past event, and not a mere promise to do something in
the future, or a misrepresentation as to something to take
place in the future."
The defendant here did make a misrepresentation as to
an existing fact, namely, the financial condition of the Hill
Brothers Alfalfa Milling Corporati1on, and it was on the
basis of this false representation that he obtained the proper..
ty in question. This property would not have been turned
over to him on his mere promise to pay, as he well knew,
as is evidenced by his admission made on the 18th of Octo..
ber, 1939.
25 CJ 594 says in this regard:
""While the crime is not committed by mere
false promise without a false statement of fact, a
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false statement of fact may beoome effective only
by being coupled with a false promise. When this
is the case, the statement of fact and the promise
may be considered as together constituting the false
pretenses and a oonviction may follow, or, if the
statement of fact and promise can be separated and
prosecutor relied in part on the former, the promise
may be destroyed and accused be oonvicted on the
statement of fact.,,
·
See Donohue vs. State, (Arkansas) 26 S.W. 226;
People vs. Bowman, (California) 14 2 Pac. 495; Watson
vs. People, 8 7 New York, 561 ; State vs. Hollingsworth,
(Iowa), 109 N.W. 1003, Commonwealth vs. Drew,
(Mass.), 27 N.E. 593.
The defendant cites the case of State vs. Howd, 56
Utah 527, in support of his position. This case, however,
has no bearing upon the case at issue. In that case Howd
purchased cattle from one Foy, and promised to pay for
them in the future.
There was no evidence of any misrepresentation as to
a present or past fact. The court there stated, ""All that
can be gathered from the record of the testimony is to the
effect that defendant purchased Foy,s cattle at Thompson,
Utah; that he there paid to Foy a part of the purchase price,
and promised to pay the balance upon the arrival of the
cattle at Grand Junction, Colorado, a promise to be performed in the future.,,
In this case, however, we have a definite misrepresen. .
tation as to a present existing fact.
The Court in State vs. Howd sets out four elements
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which must be proved in order to convict a person of ob..
taining property by false pretenses. These are:
""1. There must be an intent to cheat or defaud.
""2. An actual fraud must be committed.
""3. It must be a fraudulent representation or
false pretense for the purpose of perpetrating the
fraud, and obtaining the property of another.
""4. The fraudulent representations or false
pretenses must be the cause which induced the owner
to part with his property.,

In regard to the first element, we can determine the
defendant's intention to cheat or defraud only by his actions
in the matter. We know from the evidence which is not
contradicted that he did make false statements as to the fi ..
nancial condition of his company, that he did obtain property
thereby, and that he failed to pay for such property. As a
man is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his
wrongful act, and as the consequence of this act was to cheat
and defraud the owners of the hay, there can be no ques..
ti1on, especially in view of the defendant's admissions that
there was, on his part, an intent to cheat or defraud.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State vs. Hintz,
229 N.W. 55, said:
""While the intent to defraud is an essential
element of the crime of obtaining property by false
pretenses and must be proved by the State, it need
not be proved by direct and positive evidence. It
may be inferred from all the circumstances proved.
Where all the other elements of the c r i m e
were proved, it is generally held that the intent to
defraud may be inferred from the circumstances
proved.'"
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See State vs. Loesch, 180 S.W. 875; State vs. Cooper,
151 N.W. 835'; State vs. Hooker, 170 Pac. 374.
In regard to the second element, the evidence shows
that there was an actual fraud committed in that by a false
statement, which the defendant well knew was false, he ob-tained property of another, for which property he did not
pay.
In regard to the third element, the fraudulent repre-sentation stands out clear in the evidence and requires no
comment. Nor is there any doubt as to the fourth ele-ment, for Crafts stated in his testimony that he would not
part with the hay unless the financial condition of the oom-pany was acceptable, and the defendant also testified that he
knew that Crafts would not part with the hay unless he
falsified as to the financial standing of the company. The
evidence introduced in the trial clearly shows, therefore,
that a public offense was committed .
....False representation as to financial ability or
pecuniary condition of the accused or of a third
person are within the statute in its usual form un..
less they are mere express~ons of opinion.,,

25 Corpus Juris 596.
See People vs. Jordan, (California), 4 Pac. 77 3; State
vs. Timmins, 58 Ind. 98. State vs. Donaldson, 148 S.W. 79.
Defendant further contends in this section of his argu-ment that even if the evidence does show the commission
of a public offense, it is an entirely different offense from
that charged in the information, and so the defendant should
not have been convicted.
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The argument to sustain this position appears rather
strained. The crime with which the defendant was charged
was the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses, and
the crime of which he was convicted was the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses. The defendant.,s argu..
ment that under this theory a person could .be charged with
murder and found guilty of arson is without ground. The
variance between the information and the first Bill of Partie..
ulars and the evidence introduced at the trial were merely
as to minor matters not going with the essense of the offense.
This matter, however, will be considered in greater length
in answering defendant"s Assignment of Error No. 19 which
was to the effect that the court did not have the right
to order the Bill of Particulars amended to oonform to the
evidence.
The defendant in his argument maintains that because
the Legislature by Section 10 3.. 18.. 9, Revised Statutes of
Utah, 19 3 3, made it a misdemeanor to make a false state..
ment in writing respecting the financial condition or ability
to pay of himself or any other person, firm or corporation
in whom he is interested, it is by implication pro..
vided that no oral statement is actionable even though it
might come within the terms of Section 103 .. 18.. 8, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933. This contention appears to be
highly illogical. Because the Legislature has seen fit to pass
a specific statute does not mean that all cases which have a
similarity in any respect to the specific case would be re,
moved from the operation of the general statute. The de..
fendant would, no doubt, contend under this theory that if
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the Legislature passed a specific act making it a felony for a
person oo kill another person with a knife that it would not
be actionable to kill a person with a gun in spite of the general homicide statute.
It does not appear logical that it was ever the intention
of the Legislature to permit such rascality as has been prac..
ticed by the defendant in this case to go unpunished.
This point is covered in Oommowealth vs. Lavine
(Mass.), 181 N.E. 851, at page 856. The court said:
~.~.The

defendant"s contention that the state..
ments about the corporation were, at most, only false
representation with regard to the credit of the Mas..
sachusett"s Thread Mills, Incorporated, and so under
G. L., c 266, No. 35, since they were not in writing
do not support an indictment, is not sound. That
statute furnishes no protection to one who makes
false statements as to the character, credit and ability
of another in order that the speaker may obtain some-thing for himself through reliance placed upon the
misrepresentation.,.,
The Legislature, no doubt, placed the provision in re-gard to written misrepresentation in the statute because of
the fact that falsification of facts in written applications for
credit are quite frequently made by persons applyng for
credit at stores, and it was believed that· the felony penalty
was too severe in such cases, as such mercantile institutions
have arp.ple opportunity to check credit ratings. The worst
frauds, however, are usually perpetrated not by written mis-representations but by word of mouth. 0. Henry"s Gentle
Grafter and the legendary characters who sell ""gold bricks,,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

at county fairs and the Brooklyn Bridge to New York
visitors as well as the more realistic swindlers who sell
watered stock and citrus groves which, at high tide, prove to
be below water level, practice their ""arf., by means of oral
reprrsentations.
Certainly, it could not have been the int•ention of the
Legislature to permit persons to make such representation
with immunity and the law should not be so construed.
22 Am. Juris 452 says:
""It would certainly seem, however, that a law
which punishes a man for obtaining property by
means of willful misrepresentation or deliberate false"
hood does not establish a rule of morality which can
be deemed too rigid for honest men. Moreover, it
has been judicially recognized that to cramp the
operation of such laws with artificial restrictions
would tend to encourage fraud and swindling and
it has also been suggested that since the purpose of
the statutes against false pretense is to suppress cheat"
ing they should be construed liberally so as to effec"
tuate that purpose_.,.,
See State vs. Stove, (S.C.) 79, S. E. 108; 49 L. R. 1\.
W. S. 514; Com. vs. Watson (Ky.). 142 S. W. 200.
ARGUMENT II
In his second argument which is in support of Assign"
ment of Error No. 19, the defendant attacks the order of
the court, directing the filing of a supplem•ental Bill of
Particulars after the trial of the case. He charges that in
view of the fact that the Bill of Pariculars was amended as
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to some matters following the trial of the action, it necessarily follows that the defendant was not properly bound
over to the District Court to stand trial for the charge upon
which he was ultimately convicted.
In making this charge the defendant ignores entirely
certain statements made later in his brief to the effect that
the Bill of Particulars is no part of the information and
does not change the nature of the offense that is charged.
The State agrees with this position and with the two Utah
cases, State vs. Solomon, 93 Utah 70 and State vs. Jessup,
98 Utah 482, which hold to this effect.
The. State agrees further with the defendant,s state..
ment made later in his brief that the information itself,
separate and apart from the Bill of Particulars, must state
a cause of action. This being true, how could any amend..
ment to the Bill of Particulars change the nature of the
offense? The record shows that the complaint which was
filed in the Justice.,s Court and upon which a p!ieliminary
hearing was conducted, charged the defendant with the
commission of the crime of obtaining property by false pre..
tenses as follows: ~.~.That the said Frank R. Hill, at the time
and place last aforesaid, did obtain 112,905 pounds of al..
falfa hay of the value of $536.30 from Dudley and Reed
Crafts by means of false pretenses ..,., The information which
was filed by the District Attorney charg~s the offense as
follows: ~. . That the said Frank R. Hill, on or about the 30th
day of July, 1939, at Delta, County of Millard, State of
Utah, did obtain 112,905 pounds of alfalfa hay of a value
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of $536.30 from Dudley and Reed Crafts by means of
false pretenses."" The question as to whether or not the com.plaint and the information which was based thereon state
a cause of action standing by themselves, separate and apart
from the Bill of Particulars, will be considered at greater de-tail later in the brief when answering defendant., s argument
No. 3 in support of Assignments of Error No. 1 to No. 6.
The purpose of the Bill of Particulars, as stated be-fore, is not to aid the information in stating a cause of ac-tion but to inform the defendant regarding the facts which
the st~te will prove in support of such information in order
that the defendant may have an opoprtunity to prepare
to meet the evidence introduced by the State. Section
105.-21.-9, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as enacted by
Chapter 118 of Laws of Utah, 1935, reads in part as follows:
""When an information or indictment . charges
an offense. in accordance with the provisions of Sec~
tion 105.. 21.-8, but fails to inform the defendant of
the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable
him to prepare his defense or to give him such in. .
formation as he is entitled to under the Constitution
of this State, the court rnay, of its own motion~ and
shall at the r•equest of the defendant, order the prose..
cuting attorney to furnish a Bill of Particulars con"'
taining such information as may be necessary for
these purposes.'"
Subsection 2 of Section 10 5.. 21,4 3, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, as enacted by Chapter 118, Laws of Utah,
19 3;, provides as follows:
""No variance between those allegations of an
information, indictment or Bill of Particulars which
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state the _particulars of the offense whether amended
or not, and the evidence offered in support thereof
shall be ground for the acquittal of the defendant.
The court may at any time cause the information,
indictment or Bill of Particulars to be amended in
respect to any such variance to conform to the evi..
dence.,,
The right of the court to permit an amendment to
the Bill of Particulars, even in the absence of statutory
permission such as is given above is recognized by most
courts. See State vs. W·adford (N. C.), 129 SE 608.
In face of express statutory provision, such as is given
by the above statute, it can hardly be doubted that the court
has such power. The court, it is true, could not permit
amendment of the information or the Bill of Particulars to
conform to the evidence if the evidence showed the com..
mission of a separate and distinct crime from that alleged
in the information. The information in this case, however,
does not allege what the representations were. It merely
alleges that false representations were made and leaves it to
the Bill of Particulars to set out the exact statement. The
exact nature of the statement which was made would clearly,
therefore, it seems, come under the terms of the statute
above which permits amendment of the allegations "'which
state the particulars of offense."
Likewise, the allegation regarding the ownership of the
hay is a matter in which amendment should be permitted
even in the absence of such a statute as is quited above.
[n the case of State vs. Sturrs (Mo.), 5'1 SW 2nd 45', the
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:ourt permitted the prosecutor, following the trial of the
action, to amend the information by changing the nam'e of
the person robbed to conform to the proof. While this
court in State vs. Jensen, 83 Utah 452, permitted the amend-ment of an information to show the owner of stolen property
where the original information had not even alleged an
owner. This court, speaking by Mr. Justice ·Folland tn
approving this amendment, said:
....While the amendment was one of substance,
it did not change the nature of the crime involved.
The District Attorney, by the original information,
intended to charge grand larceny and it is grand
larceny which is charged by the amended information. The amendment was germane to the offense
charged in the complaint filed before the magistrate
wheliein the element of ownership of the property in
Lester Jensen was p!ioperly alleged '* * * such an
amendment by leave of the court is authorized by
statute.''
The substantial rights of the defendant are not in any
way effected by the amendment. If he were in any way
taken by surprise, he could have taken advantage of the
Court's offer to give him whatever time he needed to pre-pare and present his defense to the matters set out in the
Supplemental Bill of Particulars. He states that his reason
for refusing to put in any defense at all was that the court
had evidently made up its mind on the basis of the State's
testimony that the :lefendant was guilty. I find no place
in the record where the Court indicates that it had made such
a finding. If the defendant's rights were substantially im--
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paired, whenever the court had reached some optnton on
the case at the end of the State's testimony, any defendant
might come in and ask for a dismissal on this ground when..
ever the State made a particularly strong case.
I find nothing in the record which would indicate
that the court was not willing to listen to any testimony
which the defense might offer with a fair and unbiased
mind, and render its verdict according to all of the evidence
in the case.

ARGUMENT III
The defendant's third argument in support of Assign..
ments of Error 1 to 6, inclusive, proceeds on the theory
that the revised criminal procedure adopt•ed by the 193;
Legislature, providing for short form informations and in..
dictments, is unconstitutional. He freely admits, both in
his brief and in argument, at the time of the trial, that the
informaion as drawn meets the requirements of Chapter
118, Laws of Utah, 1935. He alleges, however, that this
section is unconstitutional in that it abridges certain rights
which are guaranteed to the accused under the terms of
the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The reformed procedure, which- was adopted by our
Legislature in 19 35, was not the result of hasty and ill..
considered action. The Legislature followed the form rec..
ommended by the American Law Institute after lengthy and
detailed study on the matter. Substantially the same statute
has, over the past several years, been put into operation in
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many of the states of the Union and although its constitutionality has been challenged by many cases the State is
not aware of a case in which this act has been invalidated.
At the time of the formation of the Government of
the United States, the people were seeking a way to escape
cruel and inhumane punishments which had often been in.flicted without a fair and a~equate trial. As a result, num.erous technical sateguards were thrown up around the ac.cused among which were the very technical rules which
existed in regard to criminal pleading. A minor infraction
of any ~of these rules, although it did not in the least preju.dice the substantial rights of the accused, wa~ a basis for an
acquittal. As a result, far from promoting justice, these
technical rules of criminal pleadings very frequently afford,
ed an avenue of escape for an obviously guilty criminal.
It was to escape this situation that reform in criminal pro-cedure was undertaken and the courts of this country have
generally recognized that the old, needlessly technical rules
are outmoded, if indeed they ever served a worthy purpose.
One of the first cases to uphold the reformed procedure
such as we have now adopted in the State of Utah was the
case of People vs. Bogdanoff, 254 NY 16, decided in 1930.
The majority opinion in this ~ase was written by the emi..
nent Judge Lehman and was concurred in by Chief Justice
Pound and by Justice Cardozo, later of the United States
Supreme Court. The court in this opinion repeated with
approval the words of the New York Commissioner in re..
gard to the reform procedure as follows:
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. They are not ignorant of the fact that their
proposed reform will strike at the root of a system
artificial and absurd in itself, and which is only
saved from the oontempt it merits, by the frequent
use of the names of venerable legal authorities, under
whose sanction it has grown and ripened into rna ..
turity * * * Nor will they allow themselves to believe that absurdities and fictions so glaring and
gross in themselves as to pPovoke the laughter and
contempt of the intelligent, will be permitted to
continue longer than until a safe substitute for them
can be found."'
Defendant maintains that a Bill of Particulars cannot be
used to aid the information in meeting the requirements
of the Constitution because Article 1, Section 13 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah provided that offenses
which had heretofore been prosecuted by indictment shall
be prosecuted by information after examination and com..
mitment by a magistrate. FPom this he jumps to what the
State regards as a highly illogical conclusion that this con-stitutional provision protected the information with all of
its technicalities exactly as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. This same point was raised in
People vs. Bogdanoff, supra, and was disposed of by the
court in the following language:
....We may not hold that the framers oi the
Constitution intended that all the formalities of the
old common law indictments must remain forever
inviolate * * * The Legislature cannot suspend with
a "written accusation' by the Grand Jury but it
can prescribe new forms of indictments and dis. .
pense with some of its technical formalities.'"
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See also in support of this position, Wolfe vs. State, 19
Ohio State 248; Lougee vs. State, 11 Ohio State f:i8 ~ State
vs. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767.
The accused is still being prosecuted by an infcm1a··
tion as the Constitution provided. If the position ot the
defendant in this case were carried to its Logical conclusion,
all of our laws would be frozen in a state of immobility as
they existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitt:tion.
It is evident, we believe, that the new procedure is in no
way in conflict with this particular section of the Consti..
tution.
The defendant further asserts that the reformed proJ
cedure is contrary to the Constitution of Utah, Article 1,
Section 12, which reads:
lo(,In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accu..
sation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify
in his own behalf * * *. ,,
Defendant has cited numerous cases which hold that
the Bill of Particulars and the indictment or information
are separate and distinct d~currients, a position with which
the State has alfleady agreed. Fr10m this, he concludes
that unless the information standing alone will satisfy the
requirements of the above section of the Constitution that
the defendant's rights under this section will be impaired.
It should be observed, however, that under the reformed
procedure, 105.-21.-9, Laws of Utah, 1935, the matter of
granting or refusing a Bill of Particulars is no longer within
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the discretion of the court. In all cases where the information or indictment standing alone fails to inform the de..
fendant of the particulars of the offense sufficiently to
enable him to prepare his defense or to give him such infor..
mation as he is entitled to under the Constitution of this
State, the court must at the request of the defendant order
the prosecutor oo furnish a Bill of Particulars. It should
be noted that the section of the Constitution above quoted
does not require that the defendant be able to determine
the nature and cause of the accusation against him from the
information. It is merely required that he have such m..formation. So far as the Constitutional provision is con..
cerned it could be furnished to him in several different docu. .
ments so long as he had an absolute right to obtain these docu..
ments. This position is upheld by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in a number of cases. See Commonwealth
vs. Howard, 205 Mass., 128; Commonwealth vs. Peakes,
231 Mass. 449.
The Supreme Court of New Y ark in People vs. Bog,
danoff, supra, says:
"'If, now, the indictment and the Bill of Par,
ticulars, which a defendant can demand, may be
read together and constitute the written accusation
which the Grand Jury has made and which the ac. .
cused must meet, the right of an accused to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against
him receives more adequate protection under the
statute than at common law and an accused has
been deprived of no fundamental or substantial
rights.,,
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The defendant has cited numerous cases holding that
various informations or indictments were insufficient because
of their failure to aUege certain particulars. An examina-tion of these cases, however, reveals that none of them was
interpreting a statute similar to the one which has been
adopted in Utah and numerous other states in recent years.
The Utah cases which he cites without exception hold the
informations in each instance to ~e insufficient, not because
they fail to meet the demands of the Constitution, but be-cause they fail to conform to the requirements of the statutes
.which were in ·effect at the time the cases were decided,
statutes which have since been repealed and have been sup.planted by the reformed procedure.
In State vs. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, the validity of the
short form information was challenged and the court, al,
though refusing to sustain the conviction on another ground,
approves the short form information in the following lang'
uage:
.... The chi·ef purpose in prescribing a short form
information was to get away entirely from the need.less formalism and verbosity usual in criminal prO'
ceedings and the consequent reversals by courts
on so.-cal1ed technical grounds. The pleader had
been too often held to strict nicety in stating the
elements of the crime and the particulars thereof.
The Legislature further intended to fully safeguard
the rights of defendants by providing that the court
shall direct the filing of a Bill of Particulars where
the information does not give the defendant the
particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him
to prepare his defense or giv·e such information as he
is entitled to under the Constitution of the State.
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Many of the salutary purposes motivating the new
legislation would be lost if the Bill of Particulars
were treated as a part of the information and subject
to the same consideration and legal tests as the
information.,,
By this statement the court clearly approves the posi .
tion that although the Bill of Particulars is separate and
apart from the information and not subject to the same
technicalities, it may supplement the information in meet..
ing the demands of the Constitution in cases where the in..
formation itself standing alone does not m~eet these demands.
In State vs. Jessup, 98 Utah 48 2, this court, by infer..
ence, approves the amended procedure as to informations in
the following language:
~.~.The

information in this case failed. to· include
the simple requirements of the forms prescribed in
Section 105.. 21-47, Laws of Utah, 1935, C. 118, in
each of which the name of the victim or other party
whose participation is essential to constitute the acts
an offense is given.""
In the case of State vs. Engler, 251 Northwestern ·88
the constitutionality of the Iowa short form information
statute, which is in all respects similar tJo our own, was chal..
lenged. The provision of the Iowa Constitution, which
the defense claimed invalidated the reformed procedure,
is identical with Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution
of Utah. The court in dealing with the problem of constitu..
tionality on page 92, said:
~.~.Section

13732..C3 provides that "no indict..
ment which charges the offense in accordance with
the provisions of Section 13732..C2 shall be. held to
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be insufficient on the ground that it fails to inform
the defendant of the particulars of the offense and
Section 13732--C4 provides for the compulsory fur-nishing of a Bill of Particulars to the defendants
when required by motion on his part. Under the
provisions of the short form indictment law all of
the rights of the defendant guaranteed under our
Constitution are fully protected and in our opinion
the law is oonstituional and valid.''
The defendant maintains further that because numer-ous cases hold that all elements constituting the offense must
be set out in detail in order for the information to. state a
cause of action that it follows that should any information
fail to contain in detail every element that might have to
be ultmately proved, that it fails to state an offense and so is
contrary to the Constitution. It will be observed, however,
from an examination of the Constitution that the term ""state
an offense" is foreign to any of its provisions. The require-ment that the information ""state an offense,., is purely statutory and so a determination of what the information must
say to ""state an offense'., is also statutory. Section 105--21--47,
which the defendant admits the state ha's followed explicitly
in this case, sets out the method of stating an offense. There
is no constitutional provision involved here. Any failure of
the complaint or the information standing alone to satisfy
the Constitution is cured by the Bill of Particulars.
For other cases upholding the constitutional validity of
reformed criminal procedure, which provides for informa.tions in similar terms to that provided by the laws of the
State of Utah, see Commonwealth vs. Howard (Mass.),
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191 NE 397 ~ Noles vs. Stat~, 24 Ala. 672; Ketline vs.
State, 69 N. J. Law 468~ People vs. Robinson (Cal.), 290
Pac. 470; and State vs. Whitmore (Ohio), 195 NE 547.

ARGUMENT IV
Defendanfs fourth argument attacked the oourfs rul.ing in admitting plaintiffs Exhibit A, and in permitting Pear..
son to testify as to the financial condition of the corporation.
He claims that no evidence was introduced showing any
connection between the defendant and the Hill Brothers,
Alfalfa Mill Corporation, and that if such a connection
were established the exhibit would not have been admissable
because it was not a record of original entry and because
the financial condition of the company was not in issue.
As to whether or not the financial condition of the
company was an issue depends, of course, upon whether or
not the oourt was right in permitting the State to amend
its Bill of Particulars as was done in this case. That matter
was covered in Argument No. II, and so need not be re..
viewed here.
If the Supplemental Bill of Particulars was properly
admitted it is clear that the financial condition of the cor.poration was very much in issue, as it was the financial oon..
clition of the corporation that the defendant misrepresented
in order to obtain the property in question.
As to the connection between the corporation and
the defendant, we do not, as the defendant suggests, have
to rely on a presumption. Pearson, who testified that he
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was secretary and treasurer of the corporation, also testified
on page 28 of the transcript in answer to the question of
the State's Attorney that the defendant was vice.-president
of the corporation.
In support of his claim that Exhibit A, which was a
financial statement of the corporation, was not competent
evidence, the defendant relies upon the old shop.-book rule
which has long been outmoded. Under this rule, in order
for books to be introduced in evidence, it must be shown
that they are books of original entry made at the time the
transaction occurved. This strict rule has, however, been
considerably relaxed by recent decisions of the courts. It
would obviously be impossible under the conditions that
prevail in most businesses at the present time for any one
person to keep all of the accounts of a corporation or for
the books of original entry to show the entire condition of an
account. This rule has therefore been relaxed to permit
introduction in evidence of any books which were regularly
and properly kept in the ordinary course of business of the
company.
The same question which is raised here was raised in
the case of Watson vs. Gardner (Minn.), 236 N. W. 213.
In disposing of this contention the court said:
""It is urged that further foundation should be
laid by calling the persons who have made the entries
and proving the correctness of the entries by such
witnesses; that the same proof should hav~ been made
as in the case of the books of a merchant or shop
keeper in proving an account in his books. The shop
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ports and records kept by corporations in the regular
course of their business are now very generally re..
ceived in evidence, and the sufficiency of the founda.tion laid therefor is largely within the discretion of
the trial court.,,
The court then cites numerous cases in support of
its position.
In the case of Wyshek vs. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Company, 213 N. W. 488, the court established this rule to
determine whether or not records are admissable.
""Such records were made and kept in the usual
course of the business, and as part of the system of
keeping a record of the transaction to which they
are related.,
In support of this position see also Gus Tatilo Fruit
Company vs. Lewisville, and N. R. Company, (Ky.), 37
S. W. (2d) 856 and Edquest vs. Tripp & Dragstedt Com.pany, (Cal.), 19 Pac. (2d), 637.
The defendant also maintains that even if the records
were competent in an -action to which the corporation was
a party, it would not be competent as between the state and
an officer of the corporation. Here again he is relying on
the old shop book rule which forbade the introduction of
books in matters concerning third parties.
20 Am. Juris Prudence 825, upon this point, states:
~.~.Corporate books, records, and papers are,
however, for many purposes evidence not only as
between the corporation and its members but also
between the oorporation or its members and strangers
where relevant to the cause of action. '* * * Corpor.ate records and minutes when properly authenticated
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are admissable to prove corporate acts of a corpora,
tion, its stockholders, the proceedings of its stock,
holders' meetings, the formal proceedings of its board
of directors, and its financial condition where its
solvency comes in question."
Numerous decisions are there cited in support of this
position.
Jones on Evidence, page 3179, also takes this same
position.
Here the matter at issue is the solvency of the cor,
poration, and certainly no better evidence oould be found of
this solvency than the financial statement of the corpora,
tion prepafled by the secretary and treasurer of the corpora,
tion in the ordinary course of his business of preparing the
records of the corporation.
The testimony of Pearson as to the corporation's finan..
cial standing on the 31st day of July, as compared to its
standing a month previous was properly admitted and should
not be excluded as the books of the corporation were not
necessarily the best evidence as to this matter. Pearson
testified that he was Secretary and Treasurer of the company
and that it was his duty to keep the books. Whatever the
books might show, therefore, would be merely what Pearson
had written in them based on the knowledge which he had
obtained from his connection with the operation of the
affairs of the corporation.
His testimony, therefore, and not the books would be
the best evidence.
Even if the books wefle considered the best evidence
their absence and the inability of the State to obtain them
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was properly shown and so secondary evidence was properly
admissable. The record shows that the books were locked
in a safe and although the safe was being held by the Sheriff,
the books themselves could not be said to be in the possession of the State as they could not open the safe to gain
access to them. It was therefore impossible to present them
at the trial and so secondary evidence should be received.
Further, the record shows that this was a safe belonging
to the defendant,s company and that the defendant had
refused to divulge the combination of the safe to permit
access to the books.
The books, therefore, were in th~ constructive posses-sion of the defendant and although he could not be forced
to give them up as this would be forcing him to give evi..
dence against himself, secondary evidence of their contents
should certainly be received.
The defendant in this case was fairly tried for an
offense punishable under the laws of the State of Utah.
The trial was conducted fairly and impartially and in ac..
cordance with the procedure established by the Statutes of
the State of Utah.
The defendant, s constitutional rights were protected
and he was given every opportunity to make whatever
defense he might have to the case which was established
by the State. The. fact that he failed to make any defense
or to attack the evidence given by the State left the Court
no alternative as the finder of fact, but to find the defendant
guilty, and pronounce upon him the sentence which his
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conduct so clearly deserved. The State submits that the
decision of the trial court in this case should be upheld.
Respectively submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General.
CALVIN L. RAMPTON,
Assistant Attorney General.
Attorneys for Respondent.
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